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A year ago rock star and social activist Paweł Kukiz caused a sensation when he ﬁnished a
surprise third in the ﬁrst round of the Polish presidential election. He held on to enough support for
his new Kukiz ‘15 grouping to secure representation in the legislature after the October
parliamentary election. Aleks Szczerbiak writes that Kukiz ‘15 has retained a reasonably stable
base of support, but its lack of organisational and programmatic coherence casts doubt over the
grouping’s long-term prospects, which are closely linked to its leader’s personal credibility.
Election success in spite of blunders
Last May the charismatic rock star and social activist Paweł Kukiz caused a political sensation when he came from
nowhere to ﬁnish third in the ﬁrst round of the Polish presidential election, picking up more than one ﬁfth of the vote.
Standing as an independent right-wing ‘anti-system’ candidate, Mr Kukiz’s signature issue, and main focus of his
earlier social activism, was strong support for the replacement of Poland’s current list-based proportional electoral
system with UK-style single-member constituencies (known by the Polish acronym ‘JOW’), which he saw as the key
to renewing Polish politics.
Opinion polls conducted immediately after the
presidential poll showed Mr Kukiz to be Poland’s
most trusted politician and his (as-yet-unnamed)
grouping running in second place behind the right-
wing Law and Justice (PiS) party – the main
opposition grouping, which went on to win a decisive
victory in the parliamentary election – but ahead of
the ruling centrist Civic Platform (PO). Mr Kukiz
squandered much of this political capital as his
grouping, which eventually adopted the name Kukiz
‘15, descended into a series of bitter rows and splits
with former colleagues which caused its electoral
support to plummet. These political blunders
overshadowed attempts to mobilise for the
September referendum on replacing the country’s
proportional electoral system with one based on
single-member constituencies, which was called by
the previous (subsequently defeated) Civic Platform-
backed President Bronisław Komorowski as a panic
move to win over Mr Kukiz’s supporters. Although many commentators expected the referendum to provide Mr
Kukiz with a major boost it ended in ﬁasco with a derisory 7.8% turnout.
In the event, Mr Kukiz turned out to have suﬃcient hard core supporters immune to the kind of gaﬀes that would
have been fatal for more mainstream politicians, and in the October election Kukiz ’15 held on to enough of his
support to cross the 5% threshold for securing parliamentary representation. Mr Kukiz’s grouping emerged as the
third largest in the Sejm, the more powerful lower house of the Polish parliament, securing 8.8% of the vote and 42
seats. According to exit polls, Kukiz ’15 polled particularly strongly among younger voters and students picking up
19.9% and 20.2% of their votes respectively. Widespread anti-establishment feeling, which was the dominant theme
of the election, was particularly evident among these younger voters, many of whom were increasingly disillusioned
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by what they saw as an invidious choice between moving abroad to take jobs that fell well short of their abilities or
remaining in a country which oﬀered them few prospects for the future.
Surviving its ﬁrst crisis
However, Mr Kukiz’s extremely eclectic candidates list produced a potentially unstable parliamentary caucus.
Having fallen out with and publicly attacked many of the local government and civic activists who formed the
backbone of his presidential campaign, he came to rely increasingly upon the organisational support of smaller
nationalist and liberal-conservative parties and political associations, notably the radical right National Movement
(RN) which enjoys close links with Hungary’s ‘Jobbik’ party. However, the largest group within the caucus still
comprised non-aligned businessmen, local civic activists, trade unionists and single-member constituency
campaigners. The only common denominator was opposition to the constitutional foundations of the post-1989
Polish state and its dominant elites, together with a vague ‘anti-systemness’ that Mr Kukiz was felt to embody. This
led to predictions that Kukiz ’15 would implode as soon as it was forced to confront issues that brought its
ideological incoherence to the fore.
In April, Kukiz ’15 faced its ﬁrst major post-election crisis. The grouping came to an agreement with Civic Platform,
now the main parliamentary opposition party, and the smaller liberal ‘Modern’ (Nowoczesna) grouping, which
appears to have overtaken the former ruling party in opinion polls, that they would not participate in the election of a
new member of the constitutional tribunal nominated by Law and Justice. By removing their voting cards the
opposition parties hoped to reduce the number of deputies present to below the required quorum and thereby
invalidate the vote. Kukiz ‘15’s tactics led to accusations from Law and Justice that it had struck a deal with
establishment politicians, exempliﬁed by a symbolic handshake between Mr Kukiz and ‘Modern’ leader Ryszard
Petru. Such accusations are extremely dangerous for Kukiz ‘15 given Mr Petru’s links to the large banking
corporations which, for many Poles, symbolise the hated political-business nexus (often referred to disparagingly as
‘banksters’) that motivated them to vote for Mr Kukiz in the ﬁrst place. Mr Kukiz’s supporters responded that the
abstention tactic was determined spontaneously as a response to Law and Justice’s decision to bring forward the
timing of the vote.
As it turned out, the plan failed when seven members of the Kukiz ’15 caucus broke ranks and cast an abstention or
voted with the ruling party. One of these, Małgorzata Zwiercan, cast a vote for both herself and another
(momentarily absent) colleague, the legendary former anti-communist activist Kornel Morawiecki. Mr Kukiz
suggested that the deputies who broke ranks were encouraged to do so by Mr Morawiecki’s son, Mateusz, who is
deputy prime minister and development minister in the Law and Justice government. Ms Zwiercan was expelled
from the caucus while Mr Morawiecki, who said that she acted in line with his intentions, also decided to leave Kukiz
‘15.
In the same week, the National Movement’s political council called upon the ﬁve Kukiz ’15 deputies who are party
members to resign and form their own parliamentary circle. The proximate cause of this was the publication of a
tape recording where Mr Kukiz referred to one of the Movement’s leaders in vulgar language. However, there was a
broader crisis in relations between Mr Kukiz and the Movement with the latter criticising the caucus leadership’s
attempts to introduce a more unitary programmatic line in areas where the nationalists were at odds with its oﬃcial
stance, speciﬁcally: in their support for Polish withdrawal from the EU and strengthening Poland’s abortion law, and
opposition to Kukiz ‘15’s tactical co-operation with liberal and centrist parties.
However, although these events exposed the underlying divisions within Kukiz ’15 and fuelled speculation about its
imminent implosion, the grouping’s parliamentary caucus emerged relatively unscathed. Although Mr Morawiecki
gave Kukiz ‘15 gravitas and rooted it in the anti-communist tradition, apart from Ms Zwiercan none of his other allies
joined him in forming a new parliamentary circle. Plans to form a separate Nationalist Movement parliamentary
caucus were also scuppered by a conﬂict between party leader Robert Winnicki, who resigned from Kukiz ’15, and
other nationalist deputies who decided to stay. An important reason why the Kukiz ’15 parliamentary caucus has
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held together in spite of its ideological heterogeneity has been its relative lack of discipline in parliamentary
divisions, with many deputies often voting diﬀerently from the majority.
Mr Kukiz’s charisma is still the key
Mr Kukiz’s grouping has also tried to develop a more distinctive political identity. Although it has become
increasingly critical of the Law and Justice-led government, especially over the issue of party-linked appointments to
state bodies, Kukiz ’15 has attempted to position itself as a ‘constructive’ opposition. It has, for example, tried not to
become directly involved in the bitter and ongoing conﬂict over the membership and functions of Poland’s
constitutional tribunal which has dominated political debate since the election. While criticising the government’s
handling of the dispute, Kukiz ’15 has refused to join other opposition groupings in street protests organised by the
anti-government Committee for the Defence of Democracy (KOD), and tried to propose a compromise solution
based on re-constituting the tribunal with new judges elected by a qualiﬁed two-thirds parliamentary majority.
At the same time, Mr Kukiz’s grouping has tried to outﬂank Law and Justice by promoting constitutional reforms and
legislative initiatives that position it as a genuinely reformist ‘anti-system’ movement. For example, in addition to its
signature issue of electoral reform, Kukiz ’15 has promoted: measures which they argue empower ordinary citizens,
such as more direct democracy and referendums triggered by civic initiatives; shifting from a parliamentary to
presidential system of government; and ending state party funding and political appointments to ministerial cabinets.
It has also tried to tap into popular concerns about the potential security and societal cohesion risks posed by mass
Muslim immigration by collecting signatures for a referendum on whether or not Poland should accept refugees from
the Middle East and North Africa under the EU’s migrant relocation scheme.
However, as part of its appeal of not belonging to the so-called ‘partocracy’, Kukiz ’15 did not register as a formal
political party thereby depriving itself of access to ongoing state funding (given its share of the vote Mr Kukiz’s
grouping was eligible for around 7 million złoties per annum). Nor has it yet developed a network of local grassroots
organisational structures that could act as a counter-weight to centrifugal tendencies within the parliamentary
caucus. This lack of organsitionisational consolidation makes Kukiz ’15 vulnerable to hostile approaches from better
resourced competitors such as the Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic–Liberty and Hope (KORWiN) grouping
led by Janusz Korwin-Mikke. Economically libertarian, socially conservative and radically Eurosceptic, Mr Korwin-
Mikke is one of the most controversial ﬁgures in Polish politics. However, while his party failed to cross the 5%
threshold in the parliamentary election its 4.8% share of the vote was enough for it to secure an annual state
subsidy of 4.17 million złoties, and a number of Kukiz ’15 deputies who are ideologically close to Mr Korwin-Mikke
may end up defecting and forming a new parliamentary caucus linked to the grouping.
In fact, the key to Kukiz 15’s future prospects remains its leader’s personal popularity. Although he can be gaﬀe-
prone and emotional under pressure, for many of his supporters Mr Kukiz’s impulsive behaviour outside established
political norms is evidence of his authenticity. Although no longer enjoying the very broad appeal that he achieved
last May, Mr Kukiz has held on to much of the support that he was able to garner in the parliamentary election: a
March-April survey by the CBOS agency found him to be Poland’s third most popular politician with a 51% approval
rating (22% disapproval, 21% neutral). As a consequence, Kukiz ’15 has retained a reasonably stable base of
popular support: the ‘Pooling the Poles’ micro-blog that aggregates voting intention surveys currently shows it
averaging around 11%.
An uncertain future
In spite of its ideological incoherence Kukiz ‘15 emerged relatively unscathed from its most serious crisis and its
core electorate appear willing to support the grouping as long as they perceive its leader to be the embodiment of
opposition to the establishment. However, Kukiz ’15 remains an unstable construct and serious question marks
hang over its longer-term prospects. In the current, highly polarised political climate it will be increasingly problematic
for it to ﬁnd a niche between the Law and Justice government and the ‘establishment’ opposition parties. Lack of
discipline in parliamentary voting also makes it diﬃcult for the grouping to develop a more coherent programmatic
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identity and means that Mr Kukiz cannot be sure of delivering his deputies in crucial votes. The grouping’s continued
success, and even survival, therefore, depends very much on his personal credibility, so could erode very quickly if
his supporters cease to see him as the most credible ﬁghter against ‘the system’.
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